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This paper provides empirical evidence that mineral resources abundance is associated
to preferences for redistribution in the United States. We show that individuals living
in states with large mineral resources endowment are more opposed to redistribution
than others. We take advantage of both the spatial and the temporal distributions of
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individuals’ life-time. We show that both mechanisms matter to explain respondents’
preferences.
Keywords: Redistribution, Mineral Resources, Persistence.
JEL codes: Z10, Q32, O10.
∗We thank Yann Algan, Rémi Bazillier, Pierre Cahuc, Andrew Clark, Paola Conconi, Lionel Fontagné,
Luigi Guiso, Rachel Kranton, Thierry Mayer, Rodrigo Paillacar, Paul Seabright, Claudia Senik, Mathias
Thoenig, Julien Vauday, Thierry Verdier, Romain Wacziarg, and Yanos Zylberberg for helpful comments.
We thank the audience at NBER Political Economy Program Meeting 2012 and at EEA Congress 2011,
as well as seminar participants at Sciences Po Paris, at the Paris School of Economics, and at the Aix-
Marseille School of Economics for useful remarks. Mathieu Couttenier acknowledges financial support
from the ERC Starting Grant GRIEVANCES-313327. This paper was previously circulated under the
title “Living in the Garden of Eden: Mineral Resources Foster Individualism”.
aHEC-University of Lausanne; mathieu.couttenier@unil.ch (corresponding author); +41 (0)21 692 34
84; Université de Lausanne, Quartier UNIL-Dorigny, Bâtiment Extranef, 1015 Lausanne, Switzerland
bAix-Marseille Univ. (Aix-Marseille School of Economics), CNRS & EHESS (previously: Paris School
of Economics and Sciences Po Paris, Department of Economics); Email: marc.sangnier@univ-amu.fr
1 Introduction
Beliefs and values have gained much attention as determinants of economic outcomes
(see Fernández (2011) for a review). However, the question of values’ origin is still un-
der scrutiny by the empirical literature. This paper focuses on the United States and
provides evidence that mineral resources abundance is associated with lower support for
redistribution.
We take advantage of geo-referenced information on mineral resources’ discoveries in
United States over the 1800–2000 period. We observe the effects of both the spatial
and temporal differences in the distribution of mineral discoveries across states and time
on individuals’ preferences for redistribution. Our measure of such preferences is the
first principal component of answers on two questions of the General Social Survey that
capture support for individual responsibility and sympathy for income inequality.
We show that individuals living in states with large mineral resources endowment are
more opposed to redistribution than others. We undertake various tests and strategies to
demonstrate the robustness of this result. We then examine how an individual acquires
such values. We highlight two mechanisms through which mineral resources can foster
ones’ opposition to redistribution: either by transmission of values formed in the past, or
by the exposure to mineral discoveries during individuals’ life-time. We show that both
mechanisms matter to explain respondents’ preferences.
A history of American mining, written by Rickard in 1932, illustrates the extent to
which mining is associated with the concept of individuals’ self-reponsibility in the Ameri-
can tradition. This book has been written “to give [. . . ] something of that background the
older men built up as they went along”. The introduction argues that “in developing the
mineral wealth of a continent [. . . ] things do not “just happen”; they are brought about
by men who have the wit to see and the courage to do. Our predecessors were men with
these qualities. They [. . . ] have left us a great heritage”.1 This heritage is made of values
such as individual responsibility that are deeply associated with mining activity. This is
mostly the case because of the technical methods used in the early times of mining in
the Unites States. As documented by Freudenburg and Frickel (1994), “mining operations
and technologies were small-scale, and [. . . ] capital requirements were minimal”. These
operations could often be implemented by a single man.2 Mining was more labor- rather
than capital-intensive.3
1Rickard (1932), page ix. See the Online Appendix for some additional quotes from this book.
2According to Braunstein (1985), mining has quickly turned into an activity run by large corporations.
A recent paper by Glaeser et al. (2014) builds on this observation and document a negative relationship
between large-scale historical mining and today’s entrepreneurship across American cities. Yet, the myth
of the single gold miner still persisted despite subsequent technological transformations of the mining
industry.
3This feature also translates into unionization patterns. According to numbers from Friedman (1999),
the mining industry was the second most unionized industry in the United States in 1880 (the unionization
rate in mining industry was 11.35%, just below the unionization rate in printing industry that was equal
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The positive association between mineral resources and opposition to collective re-
distribution that we uncover in this paper could be explained by some income effect.
Natural resources create wealth opportunities that can benefit to local residents if they
provide sufficient efforts. This windfall induced by natural resources can be related to the
well-known effect of income on the demand for redistribution à la Romer (1975), Meltzer
and Richard (1981), and Piketty (1995): increasing income is associated with less will-
ingness to redistribute. This association is stronger the larger the efforts made to obtain
this increasing income. This mechanism has been documented by Alesina and La Fer-
rara (2005), Alesina and Angeletos (2005), and Alesina and Giuliano (2011) among others.
These scholars describe the genesis of values that may be transmitted between individuals
and generations. However, a key feature of this paper is that our empirical results persist
when various measure of individual and collective income are taken into account. This
suggests that mineral resources are also associated with particular characteristics that go
beyond their transaction value. Among these characteristics, it is worth noting the role of
effort in the exploitation of mineral resources as suggested by the narrative of American
mining history. The role of effort is also a dimension that distinguishes our finding on
mineral resources from those of other scholars about the relationship between taste for
redistribution or collectivism and oil revenues (Di Tella et al. 2010) or agricultural shocks
(Davis 2014).
As Bisin and Verdier (2001), the literature points out two main mechanisms through
which values are formed at the individual level. First, values can be inherited through
family transmission of traits. Second, values can be shaped through the socialization
process: individuals interact with others and mix their traits. The first process refers to
transmission, whereas the second concerns the context in which individuals evolve. We
take inspiration from this approach to study how mineral resources discoveries can affect
values held by respondents. We also consider two mechanisms. The first mechanism is
linked to the question of transmission and persistence of beliefs. It occurs within society,
across and within generations. In other words, values are inherited from the family or
from others and transmitted over time in a given group. We refer to this mechanism as
the transmission mechanism.4 The second mechanism is linked to the immediate effect
of mineral resources discoveries have on preferences for redistribution. Values depend
on events that happened during the life of an individual. Hence, “shocks” on mineral
resources abundance are likely to directly shape the values held by individuals if they
to 11.70%). This fact should however not be over-interpreted since unionization may reflect either general
political orientations or a local protection behavior. See Riley (1997), Schnabel (2003), and Schnabel and
Wagner (2007) for developments of this issue. Todays unionization rate in mining industry is roughly equal
to the average unionization rate in the American economy according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
4This mechanism is close to the “direct vertical socialization” proposed by Bisin and Verdier (2008)
but where the cultural transmission is done within the family. Note that the transmission of cultural
traits may be implicit or explicit. The latter case can be illustrated by the already mentioned book A
history of American mining (Rickard 1932).
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have been exposed to these shocks. In what follows, we refer to this mechanism as the
exposure mechanism.
A contribution of this paper is to disentangle the existence and the relative importance
of these two mechanisms for the main relationship described above. We do so by isolating
individuals that are likely to have been exposed to mineral resources discoveries in the
state where they live over their life-time. These respondents appear to be more opposed
to redistribution than those who did not have such experiences but live in states with
lots of mineral resources. The latter are themselves more opposed to redistribution than
those living in states with low mineral resources endowment. This result allows us to show
that both mechanisms matter. A back-of-the-envelope calculation leads to the following
conclusion: the exposure mechanism accounts for about 35% of the overall difference in
preferences for redistribution between mineral and non-mineral states (the remaining 65%
are accounted for by the transmission mechanism).
Our results mean that mineral resources have an effect on attitudes. Diamond (2006)
highlights the interplay between the abundance of natural resources and individual orien-
tations thanks to the case study of Montana. He claims that natural resources abundance
is part of the state’s identity and partly shapes individual beliefs about economic organi-
zation.5 All in all, this paper offers evidence that mineral resources influence the values
held by people living in areas that are aﬄuent in such resources. It shows one channel
through which economic and natural environments affect individuals’ values and is there-
fore related to the literature interested in the formation and the persistence of values and
beliefs. Although still in infancy, this literature’s empirical side is quickly expanding.6
The contributions by Di Tella et al. (2010) and Davis (2014) are the closest to our
focus on preferences for redistribution. Davis (2014) argues that individual exposure
to rainfall variations in preindustrial society had an influence on beliefs and attitudes
that are persistent today. More especially, he claims that the exogenous exposure to
agricultural risk, approximated by the prevalence of monthly rainfall variations, lead
people to develop less individualistic values. Di Tella et al. (2010) were the first to provide
robust empirical evidence about the relationship between resources abundance and the
support for collective redistribution by studying how exogenous changes in oil revenues
affect individuals willingness to redistribute. They conclude “that societies that depend
heavily on oil [. . . ] experience heavier demand for government intervention”.
5See the Online Appendix for a short presentation of the text by Diamond (2006) on Montana.
6Di Tella et al. (2007) study how the allocation of property rights shaped squatters’ beliefs in Buenos
Aires. Guiso et al. (2008) link today’s social capital in Italy to medieval institutional arrangements.
Durante (2009) argues that historical climatic variability shapes attitudes towards cooperation across
European regions. Luttmer and Singhal (2011) provide evidence on the importance of culture and con-
text in preferences for redistribution. Nunn and Wantchekon (2011) show that past slave trade shapes
today’s mistrust in Africa. Grosfeld et al. (2013) show how persistent anti-Semitism still translates into
anti-market culture in Europe. Giuliano and Spilimbergo (2014) provide evidence that macroeconomic
fluctuations during early adulthood partly determine the support for redistribution and confidence in
institutions.
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data and
the methodology. Section 3 presents empirical results and discusses them. Finally, section
4 briefly concludes.
2 Data and methodology
This section presents the data and the methodology used in this paper.
2.1 Data on preferences for redistribution
We use a first principal component analysis to construct our measure of opposition to
redistribution. The two questions used in the factor analysis are from the General Social
Survey (GSS).7
The first question has also been used by Di Tella et al. (2010). It reads as follows:
“Some people think that the government in Washington should do everything possible
to improve the standard of living of all poor Americans. Other people think it is not
the government’s responsibility, and that each person should take care of himself. Where
would you place yourself on this scale?”. Possible answers are “1 (I strongly agree that
the government should increase living standards), 2, 3 (I agree with both answers), 4, 5 (I
strongly agree that people should take care of themselves)”. Answers to this question are
supposed to reflect respondents’ support for individual responsibility. The second question
is: “Some people think that the government in Washington ought to reduce the income
differences between the rich and the poor, perhaps by raising the taxes of wealthy families
or by giving income assistance to the poor. Others think that the government should not
concern itself with reducing this income difference between the rich and the poor. What
score between 1 and 7 comes closest to the way you feel?”. Possible answers are “1 (Gov-
ernment should do something to reduce income differences), 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 (Government
should not concern itself with income differences)”. Answers to this question reflect re-
spondents’ sympathy for income inequality and load positively in the first component of
the first principal component analysis. Both questions have been simultaneously asked to
GSS respondents only since 1983. The state level average of opposition to redistribution
is higher in the West part of the Unites States over the period 1983–2010, which means
the population living in these states is less favorable to collective redistribution.
We include individual observable characteristics as control variables in all regressions
presented in the paper. Namely, we control for gender, age, age squared, marital status,
religion, education, employment status, race and income. We also control for political
7In a earlier version of this paper (Couttenier and Sangnier 2012), the two questions are used as
distinct dependent variables for most empirical results, in addition to a third question that is available
for a smaller number of respondents.
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orientation—as questions we used to construct our measure of preferences for redistri-
bution can also be simply associated to right-wing orientations—and trust in others—a
belief that has been shown to be a major determinant of preferences for redistribution
(see Rothstein and Uslaner 2005, Bergh and Bjørnskov 2011, and Bjørnskov and Svendsen
2013 among others). See Tables A1 and A2 in the Online Appendix for detailed definitions
of individual covariates and their summary statistics. Once the availability of individual
covariates is taken into account, we are left with about 20, 000 respondents interviewed
between 1983 and 2010.
2.2 Mineral resources
The Mineral Resources Data System (MRDS) describes mineral resources throughout
the world.8 The data set for the United States contains more than 25, 000 observations.
About 50% of them have lead to the installation of a mine. For each observation, the
data set contains information about the precise location, the year of discovery, the year of
first production (if any production has been operated), and the type of commodities, but
also various geologic characteristics. Missing information of major importance are those
about quantities found and extracted.
The spatial distribution of mines in the United States is quite heterogeneous. Still,
Western states have larger endowments in mineral resources than others. In the Online
Appendix, Table A3 details the number of mines in each states. It distinguishes between
all observations and places where a production was (or is still) operated. Both distri-
butions are very similar. We use the simplest criterion to make the distinction between
states according to mineral resources abundance: the median of the sample according
to the number of mines. In regressions tables, the variable mineral state equals 1 if the
respondent lives in a state with more mineral resources than the median US state, 0 if
not.9
Figure 1 displays the distribution of mineral resources discoveries in the United States
over the 1800–2000 period. More than 75% of US mineral resources discoveries have been
made between 1875 and the late ’60s. Less than 1% of discoveries happened after the start
year of GSS sample used in this paper. This leaves no room to identify any immediate or
anticipated effect of discoveries on values held by contemporaneous GSS respondents.
Using MRDS observations to track the extent of mineral resources available in each
state offers the advantage of being almost completely exogenous. Papyrakis and Gerlagh
(2007) and Di Tella et al. (2010), among others, measure natural resources using the share
8The Mineral Resources Data System is edited by the US Geological Survey and available here:
http://tin.er.usgs.gov/mrds.
9As shown by Table A4 in the Online Appendix, gold, silver and other valuable ores represent a
substantial part of the mining activity in the United States. We conducted tests to check whether our
results vary when taking into account the relative importance of specific ores in the ground. All empirical
results presented in the paper do not depend on the precise type of mineral resources.
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of local GDP of a specific industrial sector and the price of commodities. This measure is
clearly endogenous to economic activity and development, and consequently to attitudes
provided that the latter have an effect on the former. In contrast, the tenor of the ground
itself cannot be influenced by economic activity, nor by values.10
2.3 Methodology
Our sample is made of Americans interviewed in the GSS from 1983 to 2010. We first
investigate the difference in preferences for redistribution between respondents living in
states with large mineral resources endowment and those living in other states. We achieve
this thanks to the estimation of the following expression:
Opposition to redistributioni = α + βMs(i) + γXi + δZt(i),s(i) + εi, (1)
where the dependent variable is our measure of opposition to redistribution for respondent
i, interviewed at time t and living in state s. The variable Ms(i) is the dummy that
indicates the mineral status of the state, labeled “mineral state” in regressions tables. Xi
is a set of individual observable characteristics and Zt(i),s(i) contains time fixed effects, as
well as state-level variables or geographic characteristics in some specifications. Finally,
εi is the error term.
To uncover the persistence mechanisms—exposure and transmission—, we supplement
expression (1) with a variable MOs(i),b(i) that is equal to 1 if there have been mineral
resources discoveries in state s during the life of an individual born on year b. It is labeled
“mineral discoveries observed” in regressions tables. The GSS does not allow us to know
in which state a respondent was living when she was young. However, we know if the
respondent is still living in the same state as when she was 16. This constrain us to
restrict the sample to individuals that did not move between the two dates. This left us
with around 14, 000 individuals to estimate the following expression:
Opposition to redistributioni = α+ βMs(i) + β
′
MOs(i),b(i) + γXi + δZt(i),s(i),b(i) + εi, (2)
where variables are defined as for expression (1), except that some specifications include
covariates to control for individual and state characteristics during respondents’ early
years as illustrated by the subscript b for vector Z. Coefficient β ′ captures the exposure
mechanism by comparing individuals who were exposed to a mineral resources discoveries
10One can however argue that the discovery of mineral resources is endogenous to economic devel-
opment. This is very likely to be true. However, it is also possible that once economic development
is launched, mineral resources are searched everywhere. Hence, on the one hand, the precise date of
discovery of mineral resources can be seen as endogenous to economic activity. On the other hand, if we
consider that all mineral resources have been searched for (as suggested by Figure 1 which shows that
discoveries are scare since the late ’60s), the categorization of states with and without mineral resources
cannot be endogenous to values at the time of interview as the GSS sample we use starts in 1983.
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during their life to those that did not. Then, coefficient β allows us to capture the
transmission mechanism as the part of the overall relationship that is not mediated by
the exposure to discoveries.
As the sampling of the General Social Survey is such that all states are not surveyed
every year, all our estimations are performed using clustered standard errors at the state
× year level. We estimate expressions (1) and (2) using ordinary least squares.11
Empirical evidence presented in this paper rely on comparisons across states. But
information about longitude and latitude of mineral resources may suggest a within state
analysis. However, such an approach is hardly feasible because of one major stumbling
block. It is only possible to gather information for the GSS on 300 out of nearly 3, 000
US counties. Unfortunately, these counties are geographically clustered within each state.
As a consequence, there is virtually no variation in mineral resources endowment between
counties of the same state. This makes a county-level analysis impossible to implement
given the structure of the data.
An implicit assumption that we make when estimating the above relationships is
that the effect of mineral resources abundance or discovery is the same across state. A
key point that may invalidate this assumption is the heterogeneity of mining laws across
states. Indeed, the initial formation as well as the transmission of values could be different
depending on the legislative environment. However, mining law appears to be remarkably
homogeneous across states. Although marginally amended since the late 19th century,
the General Mining Act of 1872 is still the main law used to regulate mining prospection
in the United States. This law codifies the way individuals may claim property rights
on deposits and subsequent rights and duties. It applies the same way everywhere in
the United States. This law encompasses the first laws of 1866 and 1870, as well as the
informal regulation system for the acquisition and the protection of mines set up by the
first prospectors. In addition, the informal system itself was virtually identical across
places. See Braunstein (1985) and Mayer (1986) for more details.
3 Empirical results
In this section we first compare individuals living in states with large mineral resources
endowment to those living in states without large mineral resources endowment. We
also propose strategies to test the robustness of this correlation. Then, we uncover the
persistence mechanisms. Finally, we further discuss our results.
11In Couttenier and Sangnier (2012), we use ordered logit and probit models to estimate expressions
(1) and (2) when answers to questions are used as dependent variables instead of their first principal
component.
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3.1 Main result
We first start by a simple test of equality of the means of our measure of opposition
to redistribution across states with and without mineral resources. Table 1 presents the
standard t-tests for our variable of interest—opposition to redistribution—and for the two
variables used in the first principal component analysis. In all cases, the average answer
is higher in states with mineral resources than in states without mineral endowments.
We estimate expression (1) with individual characteristics to assess whether aggregate
differences are driven by composition effects. Our baseline specification includes usual
control variables for gender, age, age squared, marital status, religion, education, employ-
ment status, race, income, political orientation and trust, as well as fixed effects for the
year of interview. The latter absorb common temporal determinants of attitudes. Esti-
mated coefficients are presented in the first column of Table 2. The estimated coefficient
of the dummy variable for individual living in states with mineral resources is positive
and statistically significant. Estimated coefficients of individual covariates are consistent
with those presented by other scholars (see Alesina and La Ferrara 2005 among others).
The estimated coefficient of our variable of interest is equal to 0.074. We compare it to
the variance of the dependent variable to establish the economic significance of our result.
The standard deviation of the dependent variable is 1.17, which means that “moving”
from a non-mineral to a mineral state is associated with an increase in opposition to re-
distribution that amounts about 6% of this variable’s standard deviation. This apparently
modest effect should be compared to those of other determinants of individualism. For
instance, the coefficient associated to the protestant affiliation equals 0.098, the reference
being “none/other”. The estimated effect of being married equals 0.153. Accordingly, the
contribution of our variable of interest is about half as important as the one of matrimonial
status and almost as important as the one of religion.
All in all, this regression shows that the difference in the preferences for redistribution
between states with or without mineral resources is not driven by a composition effect
of the populations surveyed, i.e. individuals living in mineral states do not systemati-
cally share observable characteristics that favor such attitudes; and that this difference is
economically relevant.
3.2 Robustness checks
In this sub-section, we perform a number of tests that challenge the robustness of our
main result. In particular, we pursue a number of strategies to determine whether the
correlation we uncover is driven by omitted variables or by selection biases.
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State-level and individual omitted variables
The positive effect of mineral endowment on opposition to redistribution could be contam-
inated by state-level omitted variables. The second column of Table 2 displays estimated
coefficients when adding the following state-level variables to our specification: region
fixed effects, longitude of the state capital, population density, state per capita income,
and the state coefficient of Gini. All are defined at the time of interview, except region
fixed effects and longitude which are time-invariant. See Table A1 in the Online Appendix
for the sources and detailed definitions of state-level covariates.
The rationale to take geography into account is that the spatial distribution of mining
activity in the United States is broadly polarized between West and East. Hence, the
correlation could be driven by simple omitted variables linked to common characteristics
of geographically close states. We thus include three region fixed effects that correspond
to the four regions defined by the US Census Bureau: Northeast, Midwest, South and
West. The inclusion of the longitude of the state capital further control for the East–West
alignment of states. Diamond (2006) writes that “Montanans tend to be conservative, and
suspicious of governmental regulation. That attitude arose historically because early set-
tlers were living at low population density [. . . ]”. The geographical conditions of Montana,
in which many mineral discoveries took place, induces a very low population density which
could explain the attitudes of citizens and more particularly why individuals in this state
are more opposed to collective redistribution. This advocates for considering population
density as a candidate omitted variable. Finally, income per capita and Gini coefficient
in the state at the time of interview further help us to control for differences in aggregate
wealth and inequalities.
The simultaneous inclusion of all the above mentioned variables does not harm the
estimated coefficient of our variable of interest. This makes us confident that the effect
of the mineral status is not totally driven by state-level omitted variables.
Yet, our result could also be driven by omitted individual variables. Two appealing
candidates variables are individuals’ cultural origin and their occupation. As pointed
out by Grosjean (2014) among others, Americans from different origins hold different
values. We thus construct fixed effects that correspond to the individual’s ancestors
country.12 It is also likely that the composition of occupations within states determines
part of differences in individualism. Hence, we introduce industry fixed effects.13 The
third column of Table 2 presents the estimated coefficient of our variable of interest when
origin and industry fixed effects are included as covariates. The estimated coefficient of
the mineral status is unaltered by the introduction of this set of variables.
12The question asked in the GSS is: “From what countries or part of the world did your ancestors
come?”.
13Unfortunately, the GSS sampling is such that the number individuals working precisely in the mining
industry represents less than 0.5% of the sample. This makes impossible to draw any particular results
for this specific category of respondents.
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All state-level variables, as well as ancestors country and industry fixed effects, are
used as covariates in the regression presented in the last column of Table 2. Again, our
main estimated coefficient is positive and statistically significant.14
Alternative measures of mineral abundance
In Table 3, we propose five alternative measures of mineral abundance in a state. We
first use three logarithmic proxies of the abundance of mineral resources by state: the log
of 1 plus (i) the number of mines, (ii) the number of mines per inhabitant, and (iii) the
number of mines per square miles. Second, we take inspiration from Persson and Tabellini
(2009) and compute the discounted sum of mines discovered in a state throughout history
as:
Discounted number of miness =
t=T∑
t=0
Mst
1
1 + δ (T − t) ,
where Mst is the number of mineral resources discoveries in state s on year t, and T is
arbitrarily set to 2010. We use 5% and 10% as candidate values for the yearly discount
factor δ.
Each cell of Table 3 presents the estimated coefficient of one of these alternative mea-
sures of mineral abundance. Coefficients displayed in column 1 are those obtained when
only individual covariates are included in the regression. Coefficients presented in column
2 are those obtained when state-level covariates are introduced as covariates, together
with origin and industry fixed effects. All these alternative measures have a positive ef-
fect on opposition to redistribution, except for the number of mines per square mile that
turns out to be non-statistically significant when all covariates are used simultaneously.
Selection
The relationship documented in this paper could be driven by selection, i.e. individuals
that are opposed to redistribution could have been attracted by the spirit that prevails
in mineral states, or by the opportunities offered by these states. Similarly, that specific
spirit may have push individuals who do not share it to move out. We can identify two
issues related to the selection effect.
The first issue concerns today’s self-selection. It is possible that people who support
redistribution move out of mineral state. Symmetrically, individuals who are opposed to
redistribution could be attracted to mineral states. By construction, this two kinds of
14As shown by the comparison between the four columns of Table 2, the introduction of state-level
variables and further individual variables changes the size of the coefficient of our variable of interest. The
relative importance of this change can be used to asses the potential omitted variable bias as suggested
by Altonji et al. (2005). We implement this approach in the Online Appendix. It confirms that it is
unlikely that supplementary omitted variables drive the result presented here. We also show in the Online
Appendix that the correlations we uncover are far from spurious thanks to two falsification exercises by
which we randomize the mineral status of states.
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migration would mechanically foster opposition to redistribution in mineral states. We
test both mechanisms by creating a variable that indicates whether a respondent has
changed state since she was 16 years old and interacting it with the mineral status of
the state where she lives when interviewed. Estimating such a variation of expression (1)
provides us with estimates and test statistics that do not support the hypothesis that the
relationship between the mineral status of the state and opposition to redistribution is
driven by recent selection effects.15
The second issue is linked to initial selection of inhabitants into mineral states. Geo-
graphic and economic conditions can lead to a selection of inhabitants across immigration
and settlement destinations. Mineral discoveries in the mid-19th century may have at-
tracted individuals characterized by specific traits. Such individuals are likely to be char-
acterized by a very small risk aversion, very developed entrepreneurship values, and ex ante
aversion for redistribution or public intervention in the economic activity.16 Settlement
of such pioneers—endowed with particular traits—would then launch the transmission
of values to next generations. The values observed in the late 20th century would thus
originate from a transmission of values from people who were opposed to redistribution
before their arrival in mineral states. From a purely statistical point of view, significance
of our variable of interest would have already disappeared when using origin country fixed
effects in table 2 if initial selection was the main driver of the relationship. However, it is
worth investigating if we can find any support for this hypothesis.
Reversing the epidemiological approach used in cultural economics can help us to do
so. Following this approach, Americans inherited attitudes toward various subjects that
reflect the culture of their ancestors’ origin country. If initial selection took place, then
American immigrants from countries whose citizens are more opposed to redistribution
should have be more likely to settle in mineral states. A direct test of this hypothesis
requires precise information about the origin of early settlers in the United States. Such
information would allow us to check whether there is systematic variations in origin coun-
tries among individuals who settled in mineral or non-mineral states. Early information
about origin countries are scarce. As noted by Grosjean (2014), early US Census data
list only few different origin countries. We thus directly use information provided by the
General Social Survey about ancestors’ countries. Some origins are well-balanced across
mineral and non-mineral states. For example, the population of Americans with French
15The relevant estimates are:
Opposition to redistribution = 0.089
(0.021)
∗∗∗ Mineral state+0.046
(0.027)
∗ Mover−0.053
(0.036)
Mineral state×Mover+. . .
where coefficients of other covariates are not reported, standard errors are presented in parentheses, ∗
indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, and ∗∗∗ indicates statistical significance at the 1% level.
Mineral state is equal to 1 if the respondent lives in a state with more mineral resources than the median
US state, 0 if not. Mover is equal to 1 if the respondent does not live in the same state as when it was
16 years old.
16See Clay and Jones (2008) about the selection on observable characteristics during the Gold Rush.
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or Italian ancestors is almost equally balanced across the two groups of states. However,
strong differences appear across other origins. For example, 83 percents of Americans
with Finnish ancestors live in non-mineral states. On the opposite, 86 percents of respon-
dents with Spanish ancestors live in mineral states. These differences in allocation across
origins speak to the initial selection hypothesis.
However, a complete validation of this hypothesis necessitates that individuals whose
culture is more opposed to redistribution settled in mineral states. In other terms, the
lower opposition to redistribution in a given origin country, the higher should be the share
of Americans from this country who initially migrated to mineral states. To check this,
we proxy opposition to redistribution in a set of origin countries by a question from the
World Values Survey (WVS) that is very close to the GSS question about the support
for individual responsibility: “Now I’d like you to tell me your views on various issues.
How would you place your views on this scale? 1 means you agree completely with the
statement on the left; 10 means you agree completely with the statement on the right; and
if your views fall somewhere in between, you can choose any number in between. People
should take more responsibility to provide for themselves versus The government should
take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for.” We reverse the scale
of answers such that answers reflect increasing support for individual self-responsibility.
Information available in the GSS and in the WVS allow us to construct Figure 2(a)
that presents the positive relationship between the support for individual responsibility
in origin countries and the support for individual responsibility among Americans of first
and second generations from 28 different origins.
We then check whether Americans originating from countries that support more in-
dividual responsibility are more likely to be found in mineral states. To achieve this, we
plot the share of individuals from different origins that live in these states against the
average support for individual responsibility in their ancestors’ country. We expect initial
selection to show up under the form of a increasing relationship between both variables.
As shown by Figure 2(b), the relationship is not increasing. If anything, the relationship
is decreasing. Such an interpretation would go against the initial selection hypothesis. In
other words, the share of Americans of a given origin living in mineral states is not increas-
ing as support for individual responsibility in their origin country increases. Although
coarse because indirect, this approach does not support the hypothesis of initial selection
of Americans pioneers into mineral rich environments along opposition to redistribution.
3.3 Mechanisms of belief acquisition
Results presented so far illustrate the importance of mineral resources to the preferences
for redistribution. In the introduction, we stressed two potential mechanisms through
which values develop at the individual level. The exposure mechanism is linked to the
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direct effect of mineral resources on the preferences for redistribution. It is based on the
idea that values depend on events that happened during the life of an individual. Hence,
the exposure to “shocks” on mineral resources abundance is likely to shape ones’ values.
The transmission mechanism refers to the question of transmission and persistence of
beliefs. It occurs within the society, across and within generations. We take advantage
of the distribution of mineral resources discoveries across time to show that the exposure
mechanism matters but is insufficient to fully explain the overall relationship between
mineral resources and opposition to redistribution. The space that is left by the exposure
mechanism creates room for the transmission mechanism. The latter is uncovered by
comparing individuals who were not exposed to mineral discoveries since their birth—e.g.
because they are born after the last discovery—to individuals that also live in mineral
resources rich states but for whom mineral resources discoveries occurred during their
life.17
Estimated coefficients of equation (2) are presented in Table 4. The two variables
of interest are the one that indicates whether an individual lives in a states with lots of
mineral resources and the one that indicates whether some discoveries occurred in that
state since the respondent is born. Both reveal positive and statistically significant effects
when we control for individual- and state-level covariates, as well as origin and industry
fixed effects as shown by columns 1 and 2. This means that individuals who are born after
the last year of discoveries in the state are more opposed to redistribution than people
leaving in non-mineral states and that respondents that are likely to have been exposed
to discoveries during their life are themselves more opposed to redistribution than the
former. This result uncovers the exposure mechanism and reveals the role of transmission
of preferences for redistribution in mineral states.
The identification of the mechanisms is robust to the introduction of a large set of
covariates (columns 3 and 4 of Table 4). Namely, we control for birth year thanks to birth
cohort fixed effects and for respondent’s past situation by introducing family and state
per capita income when the respondent was 16 years old.18 The estimated coefficients
of interest remain positive and statistically significant at the conventional level with the
inclusion of all covariates simultaneously (column 5).
Coefficients presented in Table 4 allow us to assess the relative importance of the
two mechanisms. A back-of-the-envelope calculation leads to the following conclusion:
17Another way to uncover this mechanism would be to exploit a natural experiment as in Di Tella
et al. (2007). Unfortunately, it is impossible to implement such a methodology because of the nature of
our data. As we pointed out in section 2, mineral discoveries occurs in the US until the late 60’s, while
data we used to measure opposition to redistribution are available only since the mid-80’s. Moreover, the
GSS does not provide information on the city of birth but only if the respondent was living in the same
state when it was 16 years old. While this information allowed us to tackle the migration issue, it is a
strong limit to the implementation of a natural experiment.
18Past family income is the answer, on a 5-item scale, to the following question: “Thinking about the
time when you were 16 years old, compared with American families in general then, would you say your
family income was far below average, below average, average, above average, or far above average?”.
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the exposure mechanism accounts for about 35% of the overall difference in preferences
for redistribution between mineral and non-mineral states.19 The remaining 65% are
accounted for by the transmission mechanism.
3.4 Discussion
In this sub-subsection, we further discuss empirical results. We fist compare them to the
literature’s closest contributions. We then propose a sensitivity test for our result about
the exposure to mineral resources discoveries.
Values associated to mineral discoveries
As already stressed in the introduction, we argue that the initial effect of mineral re-
sources’ abundance on preferences for redistribution is likely to be driven by some income
effect. However, as shown by estimates presented in Table 2, the introduction of indi-
vidual income levels and state per capita income leaves the estimated coefficient of our
main variable of interest positive and significant. This suggests that the effect of mineral
resources does not transit only through current income but stems from some historical
process. In Table 4, we also control for past state per capita income and for respondents’
childhood income level. The fact that the positive relationship between mineral resources
abundance and opposition to redistribution persists when all these income variables are
included in regressions reinforces the feeling that while a part of the (initial or perpetu-
ated) effect is likely to transit through income, something else is at play. Mineral resources
are associated with opposition to redistribution because of specific features they bear that
are not limited to their transaction value. In other words, mineral resources are not only
valuable but also associated with particular values.
The above remark also relates to the fact that our main result is differing from those
of Di Tella et al. (2010). These authors show that there is a negative correlation between
opposition to redistribution and oil in the United States. A first explanation of the
apparent divergence between our finding and those by Di Tella et al. (2010) is that oil and
mineral resources have different characteristics. Boschini et al. (2007) argue that the effect
of natural resources’ abundance on economic performance depends on the precise types of
resources owned. These scholars point out the role of resource’s appropriability, a concept
that “captures the likelihood that natural resources lead to rent-seeking, corruption or
19The back-of-the-envelope calculation is as follows. The contribution of the exposure mechanism to
the overall difference is equal to the share of individuals being exposed to mineral discoveries during their
life-time (0.36 according to Table A2 presented in the Online Appendix) multiplied by the coefficient
of the variable mineral discoveries observed from Table 4. The overall effect is the sum of the expo-
sure mechanism plus the coefficient of the variable mineral state from Table 4. According to estimates
presented in column 1, the contribution of the exposure mechanism is 0.36×0.0720.049+0.36×0.072 ≈ 35%. Using
estimates from columns 2–5, the contribution of the exposure mechanism is 28%, 41%, 42%, and 32%
respectively. Thus, the median contribution across the five columns of Table 4 is 35%.
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conflicts which, in turn, harm economic development” and largely refers to resources’
concrete characteristics. Mineral resources in general, and gold and silver in particular—
that represents close 50% of US exploited mines according to MRDS data—, are more
appropriable than oil. Mineral resources are also intrinsically more valuable, transportable
and storable. These differences in resources’ characteristics imply important differences in
technologies. For instance, mineral resources exploitation is more labor intensive than oil
production. This is supported by anecdotal evidence that mining was very labor intensive
in the early times of the development of mining industry, as reported in the introduction.
Still today, mining is more labor intensive that oil extraction: according to data from the
Bureau of Economic Analysis for the period 1998–2009, the mining industry is twice more
labor intensive that the oil and gas extraction industry.
Such discrepancy in the use of labor between both industries is likely to be correlated
with efforts that are necessary to exploit resources. Efforts an individual puts in pro-
duction are themselves a key determinant of ones’s support for individual responsibility.
Indeed, the greater the feeling that luck instead of hard work determines income, the
larger the support for collective redistribution. Symmetrically, if an individual thinks
that income is primarily determined by individual effort, she will exhibit less willingness
to redistribute and support more individual responsibility. This is precisely the argument
of Di Tella et al. (2010) who argue that revenues from the oil industry are a proxy for luck
at the state level which, in turn, influences the demand for redistribution of individuals. A
similar mechanism is put forward by Davis (2014) who document a negative relationship
between rainfall variation and individual responsibility.
It turns out that mineral resources abundance is not positively associated with the
belief that luck is an important determinant of ones’ success in life. In fact, it is quite the
opposite. The GSS question about the sources of success helps us to show this by using
it as alternative dependent variable in expression (1). Estimating such an expression
produces a positive and statistically significant relationship between mineral resources
and the belief that hard work is more important than lucky breaks.20 This means that
the feeling that success is determined by hard work is spread more widely in states with
mineral resources than in other states. So, in contrast to oil, mineral resources abundance
is negatively correlated with the belief that luck is the most important determinant of
success. This also speaks to the mythology of mining as an activity that pays off only
20The relevant estimate is:
Hard work = 0.023
(0.013)
∗ Mineral state+ . . .
where coefficients of other covariates are not reported, the standard error is presented in parentheses, and
∗ indicates statistical significance at the 10% level. Mineral state is equal to 1 if the respondent lives in a
state with more mineral resources than the median US state, 0 if not. Hard work is the reversed answer to
the following question: “Some people say that people get ahead by their own hard work; others say that
lucky breaks or help from other people are more important. Which do you think is most important?”.
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after painful and dangerous work.
Age-windows exposure to discoveries and opposition to redistribution
We undertook a rather agnostic approach by choosing a respondent’s entire life as the
period during which she is able to observe mineral resources discoveries. Other schol-
ars have a different approach. For example, Giuliano and Spilimbergo (2014) argue that
individuals exposed to an economic recession when aged between 18 and 25 have differ-
ent beliefs. Their approach relies on the “impressionable years” hypothesis which states
that “core attitudes, beliefs, and values crystallize during a period of great mental plas-
ticity in early adulthood and remain largely unaltered throughout the remaining adult
years”. Giuliano and Spilimbergo (2014) build on the intuition that impressionable years
are relevant because under 18 individuals are not able to understand the complexity of
the economy, and after 25 their preferences are harder to change. In the case of min-
eral resources discoveries, the relevant time period of influence could be different. To
investigate this question, we consider all candidate age-windows. For every starting age
s ∈ [1, 50] and end age e ∈ [s, 80], we construct a variable that indicates whether mineral
resources occurred in the state where the respondent is living when she was aged between
s and e. We then re-estimate equation (2) supplemented by this variable and plot the
new variable test statistic in Figure 3.21 This heat map shows that the estimated coef-
ficient of the variable that indicates potential observation of discoveries is significant at
the 5% significance level in about 50% of the cases when the starting age is below 21. In
contrast, all estimates show non-statistically significant if the starting age is larger than
21. More generally, the test statistic is decreasing with the starting age. Another feature
of the resulting distribution that is perceptible by visual observation is that, conditional
on starting or end age, statistics are increasing in the size of the observation-window.
All in all, this approach provides evidence that exposure is relevant for many windows
and not only for the “impressionable years” period, at least regarding mineral resources
discoveries.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we take advantage of geo-referenced information on mineral resources’ dis-
coveries in United States over the 1800–2000 period to provide evidence that mineral
resources abundance is associated with opposition to redistribution. We perform nu-
merous sensitivity tests and show that our results are robust to a variety of alternative
21Figure 3 corresponds to estimates of equation (2) with only baseline individual covariates. We would
obtain a virtually identical figure if we were to use those obtained when all covariates are used, as in the
fifth column of Table 4.
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specifications, addressing concerns related to omitted variable bias, selection effects, and
the way we construct our variable of interest.
We uncover two mechanisms through which opposition to redistribution induced by
mineral resources abundance develops and persists at the individual level. First, we stress
that attitudes depend on events that happened during the life of an individual, which
means that the exposure to mineral discoveries shapes individuals’ values. Respondents
that have been exposed to mineral resources discoveries over their life-time are more
opposed to redistribution than others. Second, we uncover a transmission mechanism
that corresponds to values transmitted by peers. Individuals who are born after a state’s
last mineral resources discoveries are more opposed to redistribution than people leaving in
non-mineral states. A back-of-the-envelope calculation help us to state that the exposure
mechanism accounts for about 35% of the overall difference in individualism between
mineral and non-mineral states.
All in all, empirical evidence presented in this paper suggest that mineral resources
are associated with particular characteristics that go beyond their mere transaction value.
Among these characteristics, it is worth noting the role of effort in the exploitation of
mineral resources as suggested by the narrative of American mining history. The role of
effort is also a dimension that distinguishes our finding on mineral resources from those
of other scholars about the relationship between taste for redistribution or collectivism
and oil revenues or agricultural shocks.
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Figure 1: Distribution of mineral resources discoveries in the United States (1800–2000).
Source: Mineral Resources Data System.
22
Figure 2: Relationship between the support for individual responsibility in origin coun-
tries and the support for individual responsibility among first and second generations
Americans; and relationship the support for individual responsibility in origin countries
and the share of individuals living in mineral rather than non-mineral states.
(a) Relationship between the support for individual
responsibility in origin countries and the support
for individual responsibility among first and second
generations Americans.
(b) Relationship the support for individual respon-
sibility in origin countries and the share of individu-
als living in mineral rather than non-mineral states.
Sources: General Social Survey and World Values Survey. Each respondent’s origin country is determined from the answer
to the following question: “From what countries or part of the world did your ancestors come?”. The support for individual
responsibility among Americans is constructed using first and second generations Americans. The support for individual
responsibility in origin country is constructed using the average answer by country to the following question from the World
Values Survey: “Now I’d like you to tell me your views on various issues. How would you place your views on this scale? 1
means you agree completely with the statement on the left; 10 means you agree completely with the statement on the right;
and if your views fall somewhere in between, you can choose any number in between. People should take more responsibility
to provide for themselves versus The government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for.”
The scale of answers is reversed such that answers reflect increasing support for individual self-responsibility. The share of
individuals living in mineral states is the share of individuals from the same origin that live in a state with more mineral
resources than the median US state.
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Figure 3: Test statistics of the effect of having observed mineral discoveries within different
age-windows.
The figures plots the test statistic of the estimated coefficient of being exposed to mineral discoveries within different age-
windows. Statistics have been obtained by estimating the same expression as the one presented in column 1 of Table 4,
with the addition of a variable that is equal to 1 if there have been mineral discoveries in the state where the respondent is
living when the she was aged between s and e, where all possible combinations of s ≤ e have been used sequentially.
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Table 1: Mean-comparison tests.
Non-mineral states Mineral states P-value of t-test
# of observations 10,035 10,158
Opposition to redistribution -0.02 (1.15) 0.05 (1.19) 0.00
Support for individual responsibility 2.90 (1.15) 2.92 (1.17) 0.17
Sympathy for income inequality 3.66 (1.92) 3.81 (1.97) 0.00
Standard deviations in parentheses. A respondent is considered as living in a mineral state if she lives in a state with more
mineral resources than the median US state. Opposition to redistribution is the first principal component of two variables.
The first is the answer, on a scale from 1 to 5, to the following question: “Some people think that the government in
Washington should do everything possible to improve the standard of living of all poor Americans. Other people think it is
not the government’s responsibility, and that each person should take care of himself. Where would you place yourself on
this scale?”. This question is labeled support for individual responsibility in the table. The second is the answer, on scale
from 1 to 7, to the following question: “Some people think that the government in Washington ought to reduce the income
differences between the rich and the poor, perhaps by raising the taxes of wealthy families or by giving income assistance to
the poor. Others think that the government should not concern itself with reducing this income difference between the rich
and the poor. What score [. . . ] comes closest to the way you feel?”. This question is labeled sympathy for income inequality
in the table. Reported p-values are associated to the following test: E(Y |Mineral states) 6= E(Y |Non mineral states) where
Y is the variable specified at the start of each line.
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Table 2: Residence in a mineral state and opposition to redistribution.
Dependent variable: Opposition to redistribution
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mineral state 0.074*** 0.063*** 0.077*** 0.061**
(0.017) (0.024) (0.017) (0.024)
Male 0.162*** 0.159*** 0.141*** 0.139***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016)
Age -0.145*** -0.143*** -0.129*** -0.128***
(0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.030)
Age2 0.018*** 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.016***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Married 0.153*** 0.152*** 0.150*** 0.149***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Protestant 0.098*** 0.086*** 0.107*** 0.097***
(0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023)
Catholic 0.035 0.053** 0.053* 0.067**
(0.024) (0.024) (0.027) (0.027)
Education 0.045*** 0.046*** 0.051*** 0.051***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Employed 0.059*** 0.058*** 0.059*** 0.058***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.020) (0.020)
White 0.466*** 0.466*** 0.357*** 0.357***
(0.025) (0.025) (0.035) (0.035)
Income 0.061*** 0.062*** 0.059*** 0.059***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Political orientation 0.208*** 0.206*** 0.208*** 0.206***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Trust 0.115*** 0.117*** 0.103*** 0.107***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017)
Longitude 0.262** 0.267*
(0.127) (0.136)
Population density 0.006 0.008
(0.008) (0.008)
Per capita income -0.001 -0.001
(0.003) (0.003)
Gini coefficient -0.690* -0.459
(0.364) (0.366)
Region fixed effects Yes Yes
Origin and industry fixed effects Yes Yes
Observations 20,193 20,193 19,176 19,176
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. White heteroskedastic standard errors in parentheses, clustered by state × year. OLS
regressions. All regressions include a constant term and year of interview fixed effects. Mineral state is equal to 1 if the
respondent lives in a state with more mineral resources than the median US state, 0 if not. See the Online Appendix
for the detailed definitions of other covariates. Opposition to redistribution, the dependent variable, is the first principal
component of two variables. The first is the answer, on a scale from 1 to 5, to the following question: “Some people think
that the government in Washington should do everything possible to improve the standard of living of all poor Americans.
Other people think it is not the government’s responsibility, and that each person should take care of himself. Where would
you place yourself on this scale?”. The second is the answer, on scale from 1 to 7, to the following question: “Some people
think that the government in Washington ought to reduce the income differences between the rich and the poor, perhaps by
raising the taxes of wealthy families or by giving income assistance to the poor. Others think that the government should
not concern itself with reducing this income difference between the rich and the poor. What score [. . . ] comes closest to
the way you feel?”.
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Table 3: Residence in a mineral state and opposition to redistribution: various measures
of mines’ presence.
Dependent variable: Opposition to redistribution
(1) (2)
Number of mines (log of) 0.015*** 0.012**
(0.003) (0.006)
Mines per inhabitant (log of) 0.015*** 0.010*
(0.003) (0.005)
Mines per square miles (log of) 0.016*** 0.006
(0.005) (0.007)
Discounted number of mines (5%) 0.006*** 0.004*
(0.001) (0.002)
Discounted number of mines (10%) 0.011*** 0.007**
(0.002) (0.004)
Individual covariates Yes Yes
State-level covariates Yes
Origin and industry fixed effects Yes
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. White heteroskedastic standard errors in parentheses, clustered by state × year. OLS
regressions. Each cell presents the estimate from a distinct regression. All regressions include a constant term and year
of interview fixed effects. Regressions whose estimate is presented in column 1 include individual covariates used in Table
2, column 1. Regressions whose estimates are presented in column 2 include all covariates used in Table 2, column 4.
Discounted number of mines is the discounted sum of mines discovered in a state. The yearly discount factor is either 5%
or 10%. Number of mines is the log of 1 plus the total number of mines in a state. Mines per inhabitant is the log of
1 plus the number of mines per inhabitant. Mines per square mile is the log of 1 plus the number of mines per square
mile. Opposition to redistribution, the dependent variable, is the first principal component of two variables. The first is the
answer, on a scale from 1 to 5, to the following question: “Some people think that the government in Washington should do
everything possible to improve the standard of living of all poor Americans. Other people think it is not the government’s
responsibility, and that each person should take care of himself. Where would you place yourself on this scale?”. The second
is the answer, on scale from 1 to 7, to the following question: “Some people think that the government in Washington
ought to reduce the income differences between the rich and the poor, perhaps by raising the taxes of wealthy families or
by giving income assistance to the poor. Others think that the government should not concern itself with reducing this
income difference between the rich and the poor. What score [. . . ] comes closest to the way you feel?”.
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Table 4: Residence in a mineral state, exposure to mineral discoveries and opposition to
redistribution.
Dependent variable: Opposition to redistribution
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Mineral state 0.049** 0.059** 0.042* 0.049* 0.071**
(0.023) (0.027) (0.023) (0.027) (0.031)
Mineral discoveries observed 0.072*** 0.064** 0.081*** 0.098*** 0.094***
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.029) (0.030)
Individual covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-level covariates Yes Yes
Origin and industry fixed effects Yes Yes
Past family income and past per capita income Yes Yes
Birth cohort fixed effects Yes Yes
Observations 13,182 12,479 13,182 9,513 9,060
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. White heteroskedastic standard errors in parentheses, clustered by state × year. OLS
regressions. All regressions include a constant term, year of interview fixed effects, and individual covariates used in Table
2. State-level covariates include population density, per capita income and Gini coefficient. The sample is restricted to
individuals living in the same state at the time of interview and when they were young. Mineral state is equal to 1 if the
respondent lives in a state with more mineral resources than the median US state, 0 if not. Mineral discoveries observed
equals 1 if there has been mineral discoveries in the state during the respondent’s life. Opposition to redistribution, the
dependent variable, is the first principal component of two variables. The first is the answer, on a scale from 1 to 5, to the
following question: “Some people think that the government in Washington should do everything possible to improve the
standard of living of all poor Americans. Other people think it is not the government’s responsibility, and that each person
should take care of himself. Where would you place yourself on this scale?”. The second is the answer, on scale from 1 to 7,
to the following question: “Some people think that the government in Washington ought to reduce the income differences
between the rich and the poor, perhaps by raising the taxes of wealthy families or by giving income assistance to the poor.
Others think that the government should not concern itself with reducing this income difference between the rich and the
poor. What score [. . . ] comes closest to the way you feel?”.
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